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THE EVOLVING ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE LOUISIANA
LAW: RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CHANGES
.Nina Nichols Pugh*
The women of Louisiana owe a special debt of gratitude to Spain
for placing them in a legal status far superior to that of their sisters
in most of the other states in America. Until comparatively recently,
women and children in these "Common Law states" enjoyed a posi-
tion little better than that of chattels. The Moreau-Lislet source notes
to the Digest of 1808' establish the predominantly Spanish source and
character of Louisiana's law of persons, marriage, and matrimonial
regimes, three major areas of the private law which contain special
provisions governing women. One cannot read the various Spanish
laws cited there without becoming aware of the high degree of respect
accorded womenlin Spain. This same respect for the rights of women
was transferred to and augmented in the Louisiana Digest of 1808
and has been preserved and intensified in later legislation.
EQUAL MANAGEMENT
The most notable change in the role of women in recent times,
heralded in some circles as a great victory for women and regarded
in others as an anomalous event, was the revision by the Legislature
in 19782 of Louisiana's community of gains law, designed to eliminate
the husband's sole authority to manage the common fund and to con-
tract community debts. The husband's statutory authority as admin-
istrator of the community of gains is a concept popularly misconstrued
as making him "lord and master" over his wife, as well as her
patrimony, and has become a battle cry for those wishing changes
in Louisiana's matrimonial regimes law. Although the Legislative
Study Committee which drafted the 1978 legislation was under a man-
date to draft an "equal management" act,' one giving the wife equal
* Member Louisiana State Bar; Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies,
LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
1. See Pugh, Nina, The Spanish Contnunity Gains in 1803: S'iedud de Ganon-
ciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1969). Even today in the Louisiana Civil Code, Book I, Ti-
tle I, "Distinction of Persons," 92.8% of the articles have Moreau-Lislet source notes
to the Spanish and Roman law; Book I, Title IV, "Of Husband and Wife," has 50%
of its articles with Moreau-Lislet notes; and Book III, Title VI, "Matrimonial Regimes,"
has 46.5 % of its articles with Moreau-Lislet source notes, showing the profound in-
fluence which the Spanish law still exerts upon certain areas of Louisiana's private law.
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, r-epealed by 1979 La. Acts. No. 709, S 5, replaced by
1979 La. Acts. Nos. 709, 710, 711.
3. LA. R.S. 9:2841-42 (Supp. 1978), repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5.
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responsibilities and privileges with the husband in the management
of their common assets and liablities, the result was not as much an
adoption of absolute equality between the spouses in regard to the
management of their economic affairs as it was an act giving the wife
the right to more participation in the management of their common
affairs. In the words of Mrs. Spaht and Miss Samuel, the new equal
management principle, so-called, emerged "more like a debutante enter-
ing society under the cautious restraint of her parents," than like a
"fiery women's libber out of control."4
Nature of Property
The nature of the spouse's ownership is clearly spelled out now
in Civil Code Article 2335, which provides that: "Each spouse owns
a present undivided one-half interest in the community property." The
classification of the spouses' property as separate or community ' has
not been changed substantially, although a couple of changes were
made that have particular significance for married women. A privilege
which the Louisiana wife has had since 1908, that of retaining the
fruits of her separate property as part of her separate patrimony when
managed by her alone, has been extended to the husband.' This is
in direct contrast to the situation in Spain, where the fruits of both
spouses' separate patrimonies fall into the common fund,' with the
idea that those patrimonies form part of the capital for the marriage
to be used for the common good of the spouses, in accordance with
the classic idea of a community property system.' Thus, in Louisiana
there appears to be a trend away from using the spouses' separate
patrimonies for their common good and toward using them for the
separate advantage of the owner-spouse, with the richer spouse get-
ting richer and the poorer spouse, so often the wife, getting poorer.'
In accordance with the same trend, husbands are now permitted to
retain as separate property damages received for injuries sustained
during the existence of the marriage,"0 just as the wife alone was
prveiously entitled to do." New Civil Code Article 2344 provides that:
4. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: Legislative Modification of the
1978 Matrimonial Regime Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Spaht &
Samuel].
5. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338, 2341, 2342.
6. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2339, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, S 2.
7. SP. Civ. CODE arts. 1401(3), 1385.
8. "Toda cosa que el marido y muger ganaren o comparen, estanda de consumo,
layando ambos por medio .... FUERO REAL bk. 3, tit. 3, L. 1; NUEVA RECOPILACION bk.
5, tit. 9, L. 2, NOVISIMA RECOPILACION bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 1.
9. Riley, Analysis of the 1980 Revising of the Matrimonial Regime Law of Loui-
siana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453, 481 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Riley].
10. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
1572 [Vol. 42
WOMEN in LOUISIANA LAW
"Nevertheless the portion of the damages attributable to expenses
incurred by the community as a result of the injury, or in compensa-
tion of the loss of community earnings, is community property." The
result of these two new classifications, even though they may appear
to offer fair treatment to both husband and wife, is to reduce the
portion of the common fund eventually available to the wife. At the
same time, the wife has lost the privilege afforded her under the
previous law 2 of retaining her earnings when living separate and apart
from her husband although not separated by judgment. All earnings
of both spouses are now community property. 3
Vastly more important to married women is the newly acquired
and greater freedom of contract between the spouses," a freedom
which married persons have always had in Spain.'5 The correlative
capacity of women to sue their husbands is still limited, however, with
only four additional exceptions to their former incapacity being: "(1)
enforcement of a lawful conventional obligation; (2) a loss sustained
as a result of fraud or bad faith in the administration of the com-
munity property by the other spouse; (3) avoidance of an unauthorized
alienation, encumbrance or lease of community property; and (4)
judicial authorization to act without the consent of the other spouse."'"
With the new contractual freedom established between the spouses
it has now become possible for them to vary their matrimonial regime
even after marriage, but "only upon joint petition and a finding by
the court that this serves their best interests and that they under-
stand the governing principles and rules. They may, however, sub-
ject themselves to the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement at
any time without court approval."'" Likewise, "During the first year
after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state, spouses may
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1. For an inter-
pretation of that article prior to its repeal. see Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 258,
148 So. 37, 43 (1933).
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 3; 1979 La. Acts,
No. 711, S 1. As pointed out by Professor Pascal, the former text of Article 1790 merely
forbid contracts between the spouses in certain cases specially provided by law, but
the judiciary of the state misconstrued the article and held that it forbid spouses to
contract with each other generally. Pascal, Louisiana's 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legisla-
tion, 53 TUL. L. REV. 105, 130 (1978).
15. There was no prohibition in ancient Spain against contracts between husband
and wife, and none exists today. See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 5. tit. 5, L. 2: LAwS OF
TORO 55; LLAMAS Y MOLINA, Comment No. 8; FERRERO CONT. 2.7.1.2; LLAMAS Y MOLINA,
Comment No. 8; MANRESA, arts. 1457-59, at 119-25.
16. LA. R.S. 9:291, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S.4.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, S 1.
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enter into a matrimonial agreement without court approval."' 8 By a
new provision adopted in 1981,'" a spouse may now change the nature
of a thing from separate property to community by executing a stipula-
tion to that effect. "As to both movables and immovables, a transfer
by onerous title must be made in writing and a transfer by gratuitous
title must be made by authentic act."' The donation by a spouse to
the other spouse during marriage of his or her undivided interest in
a thing forming part of the community automatically transforms the
thing into the separate property of the donee and, unless specified
otherwise in the act of donation, thereafter all civil fruits and mineral
interests of every kind, including royalties, that flow from the thing
also form part of the donee's separate property.
Although all things in the possession of a spouse during the ex-
istence of the community regime are presumed to be community prop-
erty, either spouse may prove that they are actually separate.2 The
old jurispudentially created "double declaration" rule," which required
only the husband to state in the act of acquisition of an immovable
that he had acquired it with separate funds for his separate estate
or be barred forever from proving it, has been replaced by a poten-
tially much more dangerous provision. The new legislation provides:
A declaration in an act of acquisition that things are acquired with
separate funds as the separate property of the spouse may be
controverted by the other spouse unless he concurred in the act.
It may also be controverted by the forced heirs and the creditors
of the spouses, despite the concurrence by the other spouse.3
Although an action for fraud is available as between the spouses in
the event one spouse has misrepresented the nature of the funds
used," the last paragraph of Article 2334 has the effect of favoring
a third-party acquirer of such property, even one in bad faith, who
has relied upon the public records to the detriment of the other spouse.
In such an instance, that spouse is not able to recover the thing mort-
gaged, sold, or leased," which remains the property of the third-party
acquirer.
In summary, the classification of property has been altered very
little under the new Matrimonial Regimes Acts, but the spouse who
18. Id.
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343.1.
20. Id.
21. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2340.
22. See, e.g., Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
23. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2342, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, S 3 (emphasis
added).
24. LA. CiV. CODE'art. 2354.
25.- For a criticism of this provision, see Riley, supra n. 9, at 489-92.
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has benefited the most from the elimination of former inequities is
the husband. Without commenting upon the fairness of the relevant
new legislation, one must point out that the result is that the wife
has lost access to one-half of the fruits and revenues of her husband's
separate estate. She has also lost access to one-half of any damages
the husband may receive for personal injury. Meanwhile, the earn-
ings of a wife living separate and apart from her husband for reasons
which would be grounds for legal separation no longer are her separate
property, but form part of the common assets between them.
Management of Community Property
It is in the realm of management that married women have gained
the greatest advantage from the recent Matrimonial Regimes Acts.
Under the new law, "Each spouse acting alone may manage, control,
or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law."2
Formerly the husband managed the community property, as a general
rule, and obligated it for debts, and disposed of it by onerous title."
The wife had a limited veto power in the case of the family home 8
and in the alienation, hypothecation, and lease of other immovables
in certain instances.' Under a *tacit mandate recognized by custom,
the wife could obligate her husband for ordinary family expenses."
She could obligate her husband also when she acted as a public mer-
chant with his approval." Since 1975, the wife's creditors could en-
force their claims against her own earnings,32 although she had no
general power to spend those earnings or otherwise obligate communi-
ty property for debts she may have created.
The wife may now obligate the community funds, not only for
the debts she creates during the marriage, but also for her antenup-
tial debts, just as in the case of the husband under the prior law.
The common funds are now available to creditors of both husband
and wife during marriage, and an individual spouse's creditors may
seek satisfaction from the community assets in the possession or con-
trol of either spouse, as well as from the separate assets of the
debtor-spouse.3 Married women, formerly wailing for access to one-
half of the community property as security for their debts in order
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346.
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 6; 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, S 1.
28. LA. R.S. 9:2801-04 (Supp. 1976). repealed by 1980 La. Acts, No. 237, S 1.
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334, repeated by 1978 La. Acts, No. 709.
30. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 119, 120, 2985-3034.
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 131, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
32. LA. R.S. 9:3581-85 (Supp. 1977).
33. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2345.
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to promote increased extension of credit to them, now have that credit
in double measure. Those who used to argue against the inequality
of the old Article 2403 of the Civil Code now urge the courts to in-
voke strict interpretation." It is the best of all possible worlds for
the creditors.
Employing elements used in the three management systems found
among six of the other community property states,35 Louisiana at one
time has given the married woman more authority to act alone" and
has required her concurrence in many instances where formerly the
h.usband could act alone. Thus, her "concurrence is required for the
alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovables, furniture
or furnishings located in the family home, all or substantially all of
the assets of a community enterprise, and movables issued or
registered as provided by law in the names of the spouses jointly."37
Previously it was only in the case of movables registered in the name
of both spouses that the wife's concurrence was required in an act
of alienation.38 Concurrence is now also required in the instance of
the donation of community property to a third person, 9 except that
a spouse acting alone may make a usual or customary gift of a value
commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time
of the donation.0
A spouse may, nonetheless, expressly renounce the right to con-
cur in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovables,
of all or substantially all of the community movables, or of all or
substantially all of a community enterprise." The spouse may also re-
nounce the right to participate in the management of a community
enterprise.'2 Such renunciations may be irrevocable for a stated term,'3
and they may be in any form. The renouncing spouse, however, may
reserve the right to concur in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of certain, specifically described community immovables."
34. Riley, supra n. 9, at 492 et seq.
35. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 2 25-214 (amended 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE S 5125 (amended
1977). S 5127 (amended 1974), 5 5127.5 (amended 1971), S 5128 (amended 1974); IDAHO
CODE S 32-912 (amended 1974); NEV. REv. STAT. S 123-230 (amended 1975); N. M. REV. STAT.
ANN. SS 40-3-13, 40-3-14 (amended 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 26.16.030 (amended 1972).
36. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2346.
37. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2347.
38. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404, repealed by 19:79 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
39. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2349, as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 709, S 1.
40. Id.
41. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2348, as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 132.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See Riley, supra n. 9, at 503, for a criticism of the right to renounce and
calling for further amendments.
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When concurrence is required, but has been refused arbitrarily,
or is impossible to obtain because of the physical incapacity, mental
incompetence, commitment, imprisonment, or absence of the other
spouse, the court may authorize the spouse requesting the concur-
rence to act alone upon a showing that it is in the best interest of
the family."5
In providing for concurrent acts Louisiana has been a little more
specific than have other states, but in the matter of extending ex-
clusive management over community assets she has been far more
generous, appearing almost to have created the possibility of a "two-
fund" system, a concept in fact rejected by the Legislature in 1977.40
The spouse who is the sole manager of a community enterprise has
the exclusive right to alienate, encumber, or lease its movables, unless
they are issued in the name of the other spouse or in their joint names,
in which case concurrence of the other spouse is required by law. 7
Likewise, Louisiana permits the spouse who is a business partner to
have exclusive management over the partnership interest,'8 contrary
to the practice in other states. Additionally, a spouse has the exclusive
right to manage, alienate, encumber, or lease movables,"5 such as auto-
mobiles,' aircrafts 5 boats," insurance policies,' . securities,"' and sav-
ings and loan and bank accounts 5 issued in that spouse's name alone.
Only in Louisiana is a spouse provided such exclusive management
of a community movable. Furthermore, there is no provision regarding
the nullity of an act affecting a movable. In the case of immovables,
however, when there has been no renunciation, the alienation, encum-
brance, or lease of a community immovable requiring concurrence of
the spouses is considered a relative nullity if attempted by one spouse
only." The alienation, encumbrance, or lease of the assets of a com-
munity enterprise by the non-manager spouse is also subject to at-
tack as being a relative nullity. 7 Presumably the general law of obliga-
tions, and the specific laws governing banking and securities, apply
in such instances.
45. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2355.
46. La. H.B. 783, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977).
47. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2350.
48. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2352.
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2351.
50. LA. R.S. 32:707 (Supp. 1981).
51. 49 U.S.C. S 1403 (1976).
52. LA. R.S. 34:851.8 (Supp. 1974).
53. LA. R.S. 22:624 (Supp. 1958).
54. LA. R.S. 12:103 (Supp. 1968).
55. LA. R.S. 6:731(c) (Supp. 1976).
56. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2353.
57. Id.
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The dangers inherent in "exclusive management" are such that
there remains a need for more protection of the spouse who is neither
the managing partner in such an enterprise nor the person in whose
name the movable is registered. The effect of the husband's exclusive
management of movables upon the stay-at-home wife without earn-
ings and without access to a separate patrimony and its fruits (and
there are still a substantial number of wives in Louisiana today in
this position) could well be to perpetuate the dominant position of
the husband in the administration of community assets. 8 When one
considers that the primary wealth of the average Louisiana family
is in movables, the dangers inherent in exclusive management become
even more alarming. A typical family in Louisiana probably owns on-
ly one immovable, the family home, and invests the greater part of
its income in furniture, an automobile, a boat, a few shares of stock,
and some insurance. Surely the freedom of commerce does not justify
such an unfettered and exclusive form of management. It would seem
that once again creditors' rights have prevailed over concern for the
protection of spouses."
Termination of Community Regime
In order to balance the dominant powers of administration over
the community of gains previously exercised by the husband, the
widow or ex-wife was given certain privileges at the time the com-
munity regime was terminated, whether by death, divorce, or legal
separation. With the increased responsibilities of management con-
ferred upon the wife by the new Matrimonial Regimes Act, she has
been deprived of important privileges formerly enjoyed by her upon
termination of the community. Again, it is the creditors who have
benefited most under the new legislation.
Formerly the widow or ex-wife had the privilege of renouncing
the community of gains altogether"0 or of accepting it with benefit
of inventory.8' During the delays granted for the taking of an inven-
tory and for her deliberation, the wife received her maintenance "and
that of her servants out of the provision in store" and, according to
this quaint code provision, if that were insufficient, she could borrow
on the common stock on hand, provided she used "the privilege with
moderation."6 She owed no rent for the residence which she occupied
if it belonged to the community or to the heirs of the husband and,
58. For a severe criticism of exclusive management of community movables, see
Riley, supra n. 9, at 495-501.
59. Id.
60. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2410, 2417, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1.
61. LA. R.S. 9:2821, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627; 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 3.
62. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2419, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 6; 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, S 1.
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if the marital domicile were being rented, the widow or ex-wife dur-
ing the period for inventory and deliberation 3 could charge the rent
to the community. All of these privileges have now been forfeited
in the interest of assumption of greater responsibility.
Not satisfied with such paternalistic protection and consideration,
married women have cried out shrilly, particularly since the 1973 deci-
sion in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc.," wherein it was held that during
marriage the husband's creditors, but not the wife's, could reach the
community funds for the satisfaction of his separate debts. Married
women felt that the Creech interpretation of the relevant code ar-
ticles severely limited their ability to obtain credit. With the adop-
tion of the new Matrimonial Regimes Act, the relationships between
spouses and their creditors, particularly in the case of the wife's
creditors, have changed dramatically.
Obligations incurred by the spouses have been defined a little more
precisely by the new act:
A separate obligation of a spouse is one incurred by that spouse
prior to the establishment or after the termination of a community
property regime, or one incurred during the existence of a com-
munity property regime though not for the common interest of
the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse. An obligation
resulting from an intentional wrong not perpetrated for the benefit
of the community, or an obligation incurred for the separate prop-
erty of a spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the com-
munity, the family, or the other spouse, is likewise a separate
obligation.5
A community obligation was defined previously in relation to the time
it was incurred." To that requirement was added the provision that
the obligation be "for the common interest of the other spouse.""7 All
obligations incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community
regime, other than those legislatively characterized as separate, are
presumed to be common obligations."8 Alimentary obligations imposed
by law are now deemed to be community obligations," unlike the situa-
tion in Spain where they are considered separate.'
63. Id.
64. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). rer,'d find remonded,
296 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
65. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2363.
66. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2403, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, 1.
67. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2360.
68. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2316.
69. LA. CIV. ComE art. 2362.
70. LAS SIETE PARTIDAs bk. 4, tit. 19, L. 2 (a natural right); autrd FEiIiRERO JUi.
1.1.3.3.73-75; NOViSIMA RECOPILACON 10.4.2, comment by Matienzo: GI.oss VII, No. 10;
GUTIERREZ, Quaestio CXXIX.
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A community property regime terminates by the death of a spouse
or by a judgment of divorce, separation from bed and board, or separa-
tion of property.7 ' Now the spouses may contract to terminate the
community regime during their marriage, although judicial approval
is required." The 1981 Legislature provided additionaly that the
spouses themselves may partition the community assets in whole or
in part during the existence of the community regime without judicial
approval.73
Although there is a provision for reimbursement as between the
spouses after termination of the community regime,7' it is quite clear
from the language of the primary relevant article that it is the pre-
termination creditors who are being favored-not the spouses. Arti-
cle 2357 provides as follows:
An obligation incurred by a spouse before or during the community
property regime may be satisfied after termination of the regime
from the property of the former community and from the separate
property of the spouse who incurred the obligation.
If a spouse disposes of property of the former community for a
purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations, he
is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the
value of that community property.
A spouse may by written act assume responsibility for one-half
of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse. In such
case, the assuming spouse may dispose of community property
for the obligations incurred by the other spouse.
Not only did the wife under the former matrimonial regimes law
have the right to renounce the community" or to accept it with benefit
of inventory," but also she had the right to protect her separate assets
from the community creditors and from her husband's separate
creditors." It is apparent from the provisions of new Article 2357 that
the wife has paid dearly for the privilege of participating in the man-
agement of the community property during marriage. The wife's
separate property, as well as her share of the community property,
is now subject to the claims of the community creditors. If she has
been married before, then that property is even subject to the claims
71. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2356.
72. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336.
73. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, S 3.
74. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2358 et seq.
75. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2410, 2411, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 629; 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, S 1.
76. LA. R.S. 9:2821, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 6:1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
77. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2387-91, 2403-04, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
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of her former husband's separate creditors. As Professor Janet Mary
Riley points out:
The first sentence of Article 2357170 permits a spouse who is in
possession of more than his one-half interest in the property of
the former community, after the termination of the community
property regime, to use this half to pay even those of his separate
obligations that were incurred before the creation of the legal com-
munity property regime. Article 2357 further permits the separate
creditor of one spouse to seize all the assets of the former commun-
ity whether or not they are still in the possession of his debtor.
The creditor can thus demand payment of one spouse's separate
debt out of property that belongs to the other spouse-the half-
interest in the former community property now owned exclusively
by the non-debtor spouse. Nothing in the article limits such a
creditor's right to the not-yet-partitioned property; therefore, he
can apparently follow it even after partition. This gives separate
debtor spouses and their creditors far greater rights than those
enjoyed by husbands and their separate creditors prior to the 1980
revision;2" the result is at once bad law and bad economics. It
is, moreover, of questionable constitutionality-possibly con-
stituting a taking of property without due process of law. 2'
Once the community was terminated, spouses in the past became,
as to their former community property, simply co-owners. 73 As
such, each one's undivided half-interest in co-owned property con-
tinued to be liable for the satisfaction of its owner's obligations
and no more,27 4 as is true of co-owners who were never married
to each other. Before 1980, a husband who ceased to be head and
master of the former community property upon dissolution of the
270. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (West Supp. 1980) and accompanying
comment.
271. Id. art. 2409 (West 1971) (repealed 1979); see also id. art. 2403 (West 1971)
(repealed 1979).
The debt sued on was contracted by G. W. Sims before the marriage between
him and Elvira Sims, consequently it must be acquitted out of his own property,
and not out of the share of the community belonging to his wife, C. C. art. 2372.
Markham v. Allen, 22 La. Ann. 513, 514 (1870). Distinguishable are cases referr-
ing the wife to her remedy only against the husband, in that the husband or
his creditor in those cases exercised the husband's power to pay his separate
obligation with community funds during the existence of the community, not after
its dissolution. See, e.g., Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973)
and cases cited therein; Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945);
Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
272. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV S 1. The Louisiana constitutional counterpart to the
federal due process clause is Art. 1, S 2, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.
273. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 408 (West Supp. 1980); see also id. art. 2336.
274. Id. arts. 3182, 3183 (West 1952).
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regime had no right to use more than his own one-half interest
in the former community property to pay his separate obligations;
nor had his creditor any right against his wife's interest.7 5 This
author vigorously opposes this new legislative attempt to grant
one person's creditors a right against another person's property.
It is submitted that this provision, if not deleted by the legislature,
should be challenged in the courts."5
Professor Riley argues, also, that the second sentence of Article 2357
should be amended to change the liability for "all obligations" to "all
community obligations,""' so that the non-incurring spouse, with little
or no separate assets, would not become liable for whatever future
earnings he or she might acquire by using former community assets
for ordinary daily living expenses following termination of the com-
munity. She points out that the separate liability presently provided
is in marked contrast to the maintenance formerly granted the widow
or ex-wife during the delays for the taking of an inventory and for
deliberation.0
Although the new matrimonial regimes law provides generally that
one spouse's separate property is not available to a creditor for a
separate or community obligation incurred by the other spouse, it
makes it possible, nonetheless, for the non-debtor spouse to act in
such a way as to make himself or herself liable for such a debt. The
first way, as set forth above, is to dispose of former community prop-
erty for satisfaction of a separate obligation. The last paragraph of
Article 2357 provides the other way, for it gives a spouse the privilege
of assuming responsibility for one-half of each community obligation
incurred by the other spouse, thus limiting his own responsibility for
obligations entered into by the other spouse. This limitation does re-
quire a written act, however, in contrast to the tacit acceptance"
formerly accorded the widow or ex-wife, who might have made such
an acceptance inadvertently. The written act may be unilateral and
executed under private signature. Recordation, however, is not re-
quired, which thus leaves this form of obligation open to the possibility
of fraud." The purpose of allowing such a limitation of liability is to
bring about a definitive partition and to insulate a spouse's property
from seizure by the separate creditors of the other spouse. In the
case of antenuptial creditors, Professor George Bilbe finds this
275. See note 273 supra.
78. Riley, supra n. 9, at 507. The text of Professor Riley's footnotes in the quoted
material reads as follows:
79. Id. at 513.
80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2422, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
81. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2412. 2417, 2418, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
82. Spaht & Samuel, supra n. 4, at 131.
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measure particularly appropriate and, in the case of separate debts
incurred during marriage, justifiable. 3
Professor Riley continues her profound concern, if not downright
outrage, over the possibility of a spouse's acting in such a way that
he finds his separate property liable to seizure by the other spouse
for an obligation that he himself did not incur:
If there are insufficient community assets at termination, a non-
debtor spouse is required to reimburse his spouse (not the creditor)
for separate property belonging to that spouse which was used
to satisfy community obligations incurred for the ordinary ex-
penses of the marriage or for the support of the children of either
spouse.2
As inappropriate as it is to permit one spouse's separate
creditor to be satisfied out of the other spouse's half-interest in
the property of the former community when the legal regime ter-
minates by separation or divorce, it is far more objectionable to
allow such satisfaction when the regime terminates by the death
of the non-debtor spouse. At death, the heirs of the non-debtor
spouse become the owners of his half of the community property.
The heirs have not lived under the community regime. They should
not be saddled with claims by the separate creditors of the sur-
viving spouse. There are many unanswered questions. Will the
heirs inherit the deceased's "right" to assume responsibility for
one-half of the community obligations incurred by the surviving
spouse, so as to limit "further responsibility" for the obligations
he incurred? '2 0 Or will they be free to dispose of the inherited
community property for purposes other than the satisfaction of
community obligations without becoming personally liabile for all
community and separate obligations incurred by the surviving
spouse up to the value of the community property?"' The right
to an accounting 2 is declared in a comment" to be a heritable
obligation. Perhaps, then, all the rights the spouse had, or would
have had if he had survived the termination, are subject to the
accounting and may be exercised by his heirs.'
83. Bilbe, Management of Community Assets under Act 627, 39 Loy. L. REV. 409,
431 (1979).
84. Riley, supra n.9. at 510. The footnotes in the quoted material read as follows:
289. Id. ILA. Civ. CODE ANN. (West Supp. 1980)l art. 2365.
290. Id. art. 2357.
291. Id.
292. Id. art. 2369.
293. Id., comment (b.
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Accounting and Reimbursement
The right to an accounting for all community property, a right
whiclh is similar to the one formerly granted the wife alone, but only
after termination of the community regime,"5 for all property in the
control of the "head and master," now has been extended to both
spouses." The husband's former liability to the wife during the mar-
riage for fraud8" escalated upon dissolution to that of a fiduciary."
Although the spouses are responsible to each other for fraud during
the marriage, no accounting is required until the community regime
is terminated. 9 Doubtless some kind of accounting during marriage,
even on an informal basis, would help to insure a much more intelligent
management of the spouses' economic affairs. 9"
If during an accounting it is discovered that the separate property
of either spouse has been used for community purposes, or converse-
ly that the community property has been used for separate purposes,
reimbursement may be claimed. Articles 2364 and 2365 provide that,
when community property has been used to satisfy a separate obliga-
tion of a spouse or for the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit
of the separate property of the spouse, the other spouse is entitled
to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the prop-
erty had at the time it was so used. The comment under Article 2364
states that this is in effect an interest-free loan, so presumably the
spouses may now contract with each other freely during marriage,
and even for interest, just as each could with a third-party lender.
If the separate property of a spouse has increased in value as a result
of the uncompensated common labor or industry of either spouse, the
other is entitled upon termination to reimbursement equal to one-half
of the increased value attributable to that labor or industry."1 Previous-
ly there could be no reimbursement without enchancement.92 To con-
stitute a real reimbursement, however, and not just a transfer of
monies from one pocket to another, both Articles 2365 and 2367 should
85. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
86. LA. CiM. CODE art. 2354; LA. R.S. 9:291, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 4.
87. Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
88. Pitre v. Pitre, 247 La. 594, 172 So. 2d 693 (1965), affd, 248 La. 925, 183 So.
2d 307 (1966).
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2354.
90. See Riley, supra n. 9, at 517. In calling for an accounting during marriage,
Riley points out the irony in the comments following Articles 2369 which state that
the spouse occupies the position of co-owner at the termination of the community regime;
yet the preceding article subjects the "co-owner's" half-interest to claims by the other
spouse's separate creditors even after termination of the community, "which is a hazard
not required of non-spousal co-owners." Id. See also id. 475.
91. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2368.
92. Abunza v. Olivier, 230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1956).
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be amended to read "entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse,"
meaning from his or her half of the community assets and from his
or her separate assets as well.
9 3
If the separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation" or for the acquisition, use, improvement, or
benefit of community property,95 the obligation for reimbursement by
the spouse, upon termination of the community property regime, is
quite different from the reverse situation, in which community prop-
erty is used to reimburse a spouse's separate patrimony. When a
separate asset is used for community obligations, the reimbursement
may be made only to the extent of the available community assets.
If the community obligations were incurred for the ordinary and
customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance,
and education of children of either spouse and in keeping with the
economic condition of the community, the spouse providing such
amounts is entitfed to reimbursement from the other spouse, even
if there are no community assets." This provision reflects the marital
obligation97 and the parental obligation,"' established elsewhere in the
Civil Code as a part of the imperative law on persons, which exist
irrespective of a community regime. This is the only instance in which
a spouse's separate property can be made to satisfy debts incurred
by the other spouse without any action on his part, the justification
being that it is a personal obligation of the spouse whose separate
property is being used. This duty to share the marriage expenses and
the children's educational expenses, even if there are inadequate com-
munity assets, is owed only to the other spouse, and only at the ter-
mination of the community regime."
Conclusions
Basic changes have been made in Louisiana's matrimonial regimes
law in the past few years, in the high hopes that they would make
it possible for married women to stand tall in relation to their
husbands. As married women have been given a greater share in the
93. See Riley, supra n. 9, at 521.
94. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2365.
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2367.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2365.
97. LA. Civ. CODE art. 120.
98. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 227, 230.
99. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2365. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2372 (which provides for solidary
liability of the spouses for the cost of necessaries when the spouses have a regime
of separate property). This solidary liability is owed to the suppliers, however, and
not to the other spouse. Furthermore this liability exists throughout the duration of
the separate regime and is not imposed simply at the time of dissolution.
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management of the community of gains, they have assumed a far
greater financial responsibility at the expense of certain privileges
and protection formerly accorded them in regard to their property
rights. The power to handle immovables and registered movables
granted the married woman amounts to little more than a veto over
the husband's acts, which, it should be pointed out, is the same veto
power that the husband enjoys. In regard to unregistered movables,
however, which probably constitute a large portion of the community
assets, the married woman has been given unlimited management abil-
ity. In fact, the new matrimonial regimes law, coupled with pertinent
Federal laws and regulations, gives her enormous power to borrow,
to initiate action, and to obligate her husband and the community
assets-a situation previously unthinkable. The Legislature continues
to tinker with the matrimonial regimes law each year in an effort
to balance the interests of spouses and creditors, but manifests little
concern for the institution of marriage itself. Despite the most dire
forecasts from a number of quarters decrying this lack of concern
and predicting the destruction of the family and the inauguration of
unremitting warfare between the spouses, there seems to be little
evidence of such disintegration of the family. Certainly, there has been
no great avalanche of suits filed in the courts. Were the situation
otherwise, it might substantiate or suggest the precipitous demise
of the family in Louisiana. As the Legislature continues to amend the
matrimonial regimes law each year, and as the courts continue to shed
light upon it, many hope, and in some circles anticipate, that the new
law as amended and interpreted will some day reach that halcyon
state in which the newly created management potential of the wife
will greatly enhance the marital circumstances between her and her
spouse and reverberate into greatly strengthened relations among all
members of the family, including the children. At this time, however,
the legislative changes seem to suggest a movement toward the crea-
tion of a legal matrimonial regime in which the patrimonies of the
spouse are in fact separate and the spouses themselves are assimilated
to business partners.
MANAGEMENT OF CHILDREN'S ASSETS
Although successful in gaining management rights in their own
patrimonies, women have been much less successful in securing rights
in the administration of their children's assets. Many articles in the
chapter of the Louisiana Civil Code entitled "Paternal Authority"',
actually refer to the father and the mother and make it a true paren-
tal authority; yet Article 216 leaves no doubt that there is a definite
100. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 81, 97, 216-20, 223, 227-29, 235, 237.
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paternal preeminence in Louisiana, even today. Article 216 states in
part that "in case of difference between the parents, the authority
of the father prevails."
Article 221 of the Civil Code provides that "the father is, during
marriage, administrator of the estate of his minor children and the
mother in case of his interdiction or absence." The many legislative
attempts to broaden the authority of the mother in the administra-
tion of the assets of her children have always met with defeat. In
1975, in a session of the Legislature when the right hand apparently
did not know what the left hand was doing, a new Article 4502 was
added to the Code of Civil Procedure, which increases the mother's
right to represent the patrimonial, but not the personal, interests of
her children. It provides as follows:
The mother shall have the authority of the father during such
time as the father is mentally incompetent, committed, interdicted,
imprisoned, or an absentee. Moreover, with permission of the
judge, the mother may represent the minor whenever the father
fails or refuses to do so; and in any event she may represent the
minor under the conditions of the laws on the voluntary manage-
ment of another's affairs.
Not only does this provision give the mother the opportunity to act
in her children's patrimonial interests in more instances than just in
cases of the father's interdiction or absence, but also it gives her the
right to act, with the judge's permission, whenever the father fails
or refuses to do so, as in accepting a succession for the children or
suing for damages suffered by the child. Acting in accordance with
the laws governing the voluntary management of another's affairs ad-
ditionally gives the mother an extensive opportunity to manage the
assets of her children.
In the same legislative session in which Article 4502 was added
to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Legislature rejected an amend-
ment to Article 221 of the Civil Code, which would have incorporated
similar provisions into the substantive law. Louisiana thus is left in
the anomalous position of providing procedural rights for mothers
without enacting corresponding changes in the basic substantive law.
Mothers have successfully managed their children's assets, however,
under the authorization provided by Article 4502 of the Code of Civil
Procedure'.' and will, no doubt, continue to do so until the dichotomy
between Article 221 of the Civil Code and Article 4502 of the Code
of Civil Procedure is discarded.
101. See Garrett v. Garrett, 376 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The right of a mother to serve as co-administrator of her children's
assets, or the lack of such right, would seem to cry out for constitu-
tional attack upon Article 221 of the Civil Code and other articles
which limit the mother's right to administer her children's patrimonies.
In the analogous case of Reed v. Reed,' the Supreme Court unanimous-
ly held that a statutory provision giving a mandatory preference in
the appointment of an administrator to a male applicant over a female
applicant who is equally qualified and within the same entitlement
class under the Probate Code violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In this connection it is interesting to note that, even though the
proposed "Equal Rights Amendment" to the United States Constitu-
tiona has never been adopted, in 1974, Louisiana did adopt a constitu-
tion containing a prohibition against "arbitrarily, capriciously, or un-
reasonably discriminating because of sex." ' Women in Louisiana are
now well-equipped to attack practices they find discriminatory. In ad-
dition to the "equal protection" provided by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution they now have a non-
discrimination clause in the Louisiana Constitution.
MARRIAGE AND ITS DISSOLUTION
The societal phenomenon of the greatly accelerated dissolution of
marriages would seem to be enhanced in Lousiana by the movement
toward a "no fault" divorce based on "irreconcilable differences."
Although there have been numerous legislative attempts to reduce
further the periods for living separate and apart necessary to obtain
a judgment of separation or divorce, the present requirement for a
legal separation is six months"0 ' and, for a divorce, one year.' Loui-
siana's version of a "no fault" marriage dissolution, adopted in 1977,
provides as follows:
Separation from bed and board may be claimed reciprocally for
the following causes...
10. When the spouses have lived six months separate and apart,
voluntarily and without reconciliation; provided that both spouses
shall execute an affidavit attesting to and testifying that they have
so lived separate and apart and that there exists irreconcilable
differences between the spouses to such a degree and nature as
102. 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed. 225, 29 S. Ct. 51 (1971).
103. LA. CONST. art. I, S 3.
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 138(10).
105. LA. R.S. 9:301, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 360, S 1.
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to render their living together insupportable and impossible. In
all such cases proceedings shall be entitled "In the matter of
(petitioner) and his (her) spouse -. "I"
Although spouses are able to obtain legal separations and divorces
today more easily, more quickly, and without a showing of fault, the
same leniency has not yet been applied to obtaining alimony.
Alimony
Despite the adoption of provisions for legal separation and divorce,
which are in effect "no fault" dissolutions of marriage, the require-
ment that the spouse asking for alimony not be at fault still remains
in Article 160 of the Civil Code, providing for alimony after divorce.
There has been a trend in Louisiana, nonetheless, toward awarding
the wife (or husband) "rehabilitative" alimony.
Although the awarding of alimony after divorce was based original-
ly upon a delictual principle" 7 in that the spouse from whom it was
sought had breached his or her marital obligation of mutual support,
such alimony came to represent a societal response to the needy who
would otherwise become charges of the state.' 8 Only the spouse who
is without fault and has not sufficient means for support can be
granted alimony out of the property and earnings of the other spouse,
but in determining this entitlement the court is now charged by
statute:
to consider the income, means, and assets of the spouses; the li-
quidity of such assets; the financial obligations of the spouses, in-
cluding their earning capacity; the effect of custody of the children
of the marriage upon the spouse's earning capacity; the time
necessary for the recipient to acquire appropriate education, train-
ing, or employment; the health and age of the parties and their
obligations to support or care for dependent children; (and) any other
circumstances that the court deems relevant.
In determining whether the claimant spouse is entitled to
alimony, the court shall consider his or her earning capacity, in
light of all other circumstances.
This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary and
terminates if the spouse to whom it has been awarded remarries.'"
Clearly the jurisprudential considerations and practices of the past
106. LA. CIV. CODE art. 138(10).
107. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, No. 1259, at 696 (12th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. Trans. 1959).
108. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1978).
109. LA. CiV. CODE art. 160 (emphasis added).
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have been set in the stone of legislative prescription. Delictual alimony
has progressed from alimony based upon need to alimony necessary
to put the claimant spouse on the basis where he or she can support
himself or herself without becoming a charge upon society. The thrust
of the newly amended article, with its double reference to considera-
tion of the claimant spouse's earning capacity and to revocation of
alimony when no longer necessary, is to emphasize that the claimant-
spouse (usually the wife) will no longer be awarded what she needs
for the remainder of her life or until remarriage, but that she is ex-
pected to prepare herself to earn her own livelihood. In other words,
she will receive the funds necessary to "rehabilitate" herself, but only
for as long as it takes to get her on her feet and make her a self-
supporting individual. ' She will no longer be a "kept women." Once
again the societal evolution of a woman's assuming responsibility for
herself is reflected in the laws of Louisiana, and once again women,
in winning greater freedom and responsibility, have lost certain finan-
cial benefits.
In the meantime, it is worth noting that several proposals to limit
alimony after divorce to a period of years-for five years or for a
period within the discretion of the judge-have been rejected by the
Legislature."' This suggests that, thus far, it is recognized that there
are some spouses, particularly those of a certain age, who will never
be able to be retrained or reeducated and made self-supporting. Those
spouses, mostly women, will not yet be cast upon the public for sup-
port. The responsibility for these women will continue to be assigned
to their former husbands, probably on the theory that, as between
an innocent taxpayer and the party presumed guilty under the old
quasi-delictual theory, the latter should shoulder the responsibility.
The rejection of a bill filed in the 1980 session of the Louisiana
Legislature"' which would have made it possible for a spouse to waive
the right to alimony after divorce, but not pendente lite, which reflects
the mutual support mandated between the spouses during marriage,
gives continued credence to the general socio-economic policy "to pre-
110. La. S. Con. Res. No. 164, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980) (calling for inclusion of
rehabilitative considerations in approaching awards of alimony). See generally Spaht,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Rehabilitative Alimony, 41 LA. L. REV. 313, 373
(1981); Weitzmann & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Dif-
ference?, 14 FAM. L. Q. 141 (1980).
111. La. S.B. 806, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
112. La. H.B. 725, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980). See Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552, 554
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (which was decided one year earlier and upheld the right of
divorced women to waive permanent alimony, but not alimony pendente lite, which
is support between persons still married, while alimony after divorce is considered
merely a pension given by one spouse who is better off than the other).
[Vol. 421590
WOMEN in LOUISIANA LAW
vent the dependency of such divorced women so as to relieve them
from destitution and the State from their care.""' 3
It should be noted briefly, also, that both Articles 148 and 160
of the Civil Code were amended in 1979"' to make alimony pendente
lite and alimony after divorce available to husbands on the same basis
as it is to wives. The Family Relations Council of Louisiana had spon-
sored this legislative change, not only to correct an inequity, but for
the more compelling reason that alimony for wives had been under
attack as being unconstitutional, since it did not apply equally to both
spouses, and was thus threatened with abolition. Louisiana obviously
still thinks that the awarding of alimony under certain circumstances
is for the public good.
Custody and Tutorship of Children
Ironically the evolving role of women in assuming responsibility
for themselves may mean their relinquishing traditional rights to the
care and custody of their children. In 1979, the Legislature amended
both Articles 146 ' and 157.18 regarding the award of child custody.
It had always been the jurisprudential rule to award custody, both
permanent and pendente lite, in accordance with the best interest of
the child, but this "best interest" usually dictated that the mother
be awarded custody, particularly in the case of young children."'
Presumably the amendment was motivated by a desire to overturn
the "maternal preference" rule. The additional language in Article 157,
"without any preference being given on the basis of the sex of the
parent," supports this idea. It suggest, also, an intention to overturn
the old jurisprudential "double burden rule,""' 8 which was applied when
a parent sought a change of permanent custody and under which the
parent had to prove that the children's present living environment
was detrimental to their interests and that the parent seeking custody
could provide them a better living environment.
The new legislation encourages more fathers to seek custody of
their children, because previously they could only have hoped to win
if the mother were proven to be morally unfit."' Certainly many more
fathers are now receiving legal custody of their children. With divorced
women being expected to support themselves today, which often
113. Montz v. Montz, 253 La. 897, 907, 221 So. 2d 40, 44 (1969) (Barham, J. dissenting).
114. 1979 La. Acts, No. 72.
115. 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, 5 1.
116. Id.
117. Nethkin v. Nethkin, 307 So. 2d 563, 567 (La. 1975).
118. Comment, Selected Legislation of the 1979 Regular Session, 40 LA. L. REv. 473,
474 (1980).
119. Id.
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means that young children will be placed in day care arrangements,
it -is easy for the courts to believe that the children will be just as
well off with a working father as with a mother who probably is work-
ing, too, and receiving less pay for it. Whether increased incidence
of fathers' obtaining legal custody of their children represents a
deprivation for women who are mothers is impossible to know at this
time. Undoubtedly it means freedom to some women who are work-
ing and finding it difficult to take care of themselves, their homes,
and their children.
In the last session of the Legislature, Louisiana followed the lead
of many other states'20 and adopted the principle of "joint custody,"
under which the courts may award tutorship and custody jointly to
the parents, both temporarily and permanently, provided that they
remain domiciled in the state. 2' The feasibility and implications of
joint custody remain to be seen. It may be that separated and divorced
women will seek "joint custody" and thus preserve some of the rights
in the care and custody of their children to which they are no longer
automatically entitled.
SUCCESSIONS
Forced Heirship
In 1979, the Legislature reduced the parents' forced heirship por-
tion to include only the separate property of their children who died
without descendants, ' and then in 1981, the Legislature abolished
the parents' forced heirship rights altogether,'" this being due, at least
in part, to the influence of certain women's groups who wanted to
see wives favored over parents.
Article 915 of the Civil Code was amended also to provide that
in the event one spouse died without descendants the surviving spouse
alone inherits the deceased's share of the community property,' in-
stead of sharing it with the deceased's parents. Inasmuch as parents
are no longer forced heirs of their children who die without descend-
ants, a child may will his entire estate, both separate and community
property, to his surviving spouse, if he wishes.
For the wife, perhaps a second wife or a wife of a few years dura-
tion, who already owns one-half of the community assets and who will
120. See generally FAMILY ADVOCATE (Summer 1978). See also Miller, Joint Custody,
13 FAM. L. Q. 345 (1979).
121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 283.
122. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1494, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 778, S 1.
123. 1981 La. Acts, Nos. 442, 919.
124. 1981 La. Acts, No. 919.
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inherit one-half of the deceased's portion of the community assets and
has the possibility of being willed the disposable portion of her hus-
band's entire estate, the new amendment represents a munificent
gesture on the part of the Legislature. Another benefit which the
surviving wife already enjoyed is the availability of the "marital
portion" '125 granted to the surviving spouse of one who dies rich in
comparison to the survivor. The poor old mother, on the other hand,
who may well have been depending upon "Sonny" for support in her
old age, is now deprived of her former one-fourth share in the de-
ceased's community assets," and of any interest in his separate estate
as well."2 That parents be thrown upon the mercy of the long-suffering
taxpayers, which is a result easily imagined under the new legisla-
tion, is contrary to the philosophy of reciprocal support among family
members, upon which Louisiana's family law is founded.
In addition to benefiting by the removal of the parents as forced
heirs, spouses were moved up the succession line a notch when the
1981 Legislature provided that they may now inherit the deceased's
separate property to the exclusion of other ascendants, if the deceased
dies without any children, parents, or brothers and sisters or descend-
ants from them.2" Wives have gained as heirs and legatees under the
new amendments to Louisiana's succession laws, but it has been at
the expense of other women, namely, mothers, grandmothers, and
other ascendants, who probably are in greater need.
Usufruct of Surviving Spouse
In yet another instance spouses were favored by the 1981
Legislature but, in this case, at the expense of the descendants. Acts
442, 911, and 919 amending Civil Code Article 916 extended the legal
usufruct of the surviving spouse over the share inherited by all
descendants, even though they not be children of the marriage. This
usufruct terminates when the surviving spouse contracts another mar-
riage, unless the usufruct has been confirmed by testament for life
or for some lesser period.
By testament a person may grant a usufruct for life or for some
shorter period over his entire separate property or only over some
portion of it.'" If the usufruct affects persons other than the descend-
125. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2432-37.
126. LA. CiV. CODE art. 915.
127. LA. CIv. CODE art. 903.
128. 1981 La. Acts, No. 919.
129. See 1982 La. Acts, Nos. 911, 919. There is a serious substantive conflict bet-
ween these two acts and an equally serious question as to which prevails due to the
time of their passage and their dates of effectiveness. Act 911, the more expansive
act, provides in part: "The deceased may be testament grant a usufruct for life or
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ants, or if it is over the separate property of the deceased, successors
in title to the property under usufruct may request security from the
usufructuary in an amount sufficient to protect the petitioners'
interests.130 Thus the surviving spouse has made another considerable
gain at the expense of the children.
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
Domicile
Although Article 39 of the Civil Code providing that a married
woman has "no other domicile than that of her husband" has not been
amended or removed from the Civil Code, it has been held unconstitu-
tional insofar as venue requirements for married women are con-
cerned."' Presumably this domiciliary provision for married women
will be held unconstitutional in other instances when properly attacked.
Assistance to Women-owned Businesses
Typical of the statutes'32 which the Louisiana Legislature has
adopted in recent years to assist women in achieving their goals of
independence and self-support is the section' added by the 1981
for a shorter period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his separate property."
Act 919 provides for a corresponding testamentary usufruct "over so much of the
separate property as may be inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor
or as may be inherited by illegitimate children." See Johnson, Alston, Personal Notes
Prepared for Talks and Lectures Regarding Louisiana Succession Law (unpublished
notes, LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]. Pro-
fessor Johnson writes:
The last act necessary for passage of Act 919 (concurrence by House in Senate
amendments) took place prior to 1:45 p.m. on July 13, 1981. House Journal, pp.
29-59, July 13, 1981. The last act necessary for passage of Act 911 (concurrence
by Senate in House amendment) took place after 9:30 p.m. on July 13, 1981. Senate
Journal, pp. 121, 134, July 13, 1981. The effective date of Act 911 is Septemeber
11, 1981. The effective date of Act 919 is January 1, 1982 (dates of death after
December 31, 1981). Act 911 provides: ". . . To the extent that the provisions
of House Bill No. 817 which became Act 191 . . . are inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Act, those provisions of House Bill 817 are hereby repealed." Act
919 provides: "In the event of any conflict between the provisions of this Act
and those-of any other Act adopted by the Legislature at its Regular Session
of 1981, regardless of which Act is adopted or signed later by the governor, the
provisions of this Act shall prevail."
130. Johnson, supra n. 129.
131. Craig v. Craig, 365 So. 2d 1298 (La. 1978).
132. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 28:2221, as added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 746, S I (Protection
from Family Violence Acts); LA. R.S. 9:3583, as added by 1975 La. Acts, No. 705, as
amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 161, S I (Louisiana Equal Credit Opportunity Law);
LA. R.S. 10:8-501, as added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 165, S I (allowing married women to
transfer stock as fennes soles); LA. R.S. 46:1991-96, as added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 664,
as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 786, S 6 (Displaced Homemaker Act).
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Legislature to the provisions in the Revised Statutes governing small
businesses. That new section, entitled the "Louisiana Procurement
Code,"" provides for assistance to businesses which are fifty-one per-
cent owned and controlled and operated by women. These women must
be involved in the day-to-day operation of the business, and the per-
centage of ownership will not be diminished if the women's share forms
part of a community regime. At least ten percent of the value of pro-
curements designated or set aside as awards by the various munici-
palities and parishes of the state shall be awarded to women-owned
businesses if possible.
By the same legislative act of the 1981 session the Louisiana of-
fice of Women's Business Enterprise was created within the division
of administration. 3 ' The Louisiana office of Women's Business Enter-
prise is mandated to encourage women-owned small businesses and
to report on them to the Commissioner of Administration, who
establishes all necessary standards and regulations.
Abortion
Finally, a brief comment on the effect in Louisiana of the two
famous 19713 Supreme Court cases of Roe'35 and Doe,3' which are said
to have given women a right to their own bodies and to legalize abor-
tions under certain circumstances, thus enchancing the quality of life
for women by giving them more independence or providing some other
salutary advantage not previously enjoyed.
Although Louisiana's Criminal Code provisions defining abortion
as a crime and penalizing it'37 have never been challenged on con-
stitutional grounds and remain in the Criminal Code, Louisiana's
statutes regulating the medical practice of abortion'38 have been struck
down on a number of occasions. 3" With little success, the Legislature
133. 1981 La. Acts, No. 691.
134. Id.
135. 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); 410 U.S. 208, 35 L. Ed.
2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
136. 410 U.S. 170. 35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
137. LA. R.S. 14:87 et seq. (Supp. 1977). By section 1 of Act 74 of 1973, the Legislature
adopted a provision making it a crime to fail to sustain the life and health of an aborted,
viable infant. LA. R.S. 14:87.1 (Supp. 1977). Additionally, by section I of Act 256 of 1976
and Act 128 of 1977 the Legislature defined a person within the meaning of the Criminal
Code to include "a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation."
LA. R.S. 14:2.7 (Supp. 1977).
138. LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.3- .6, .8, .10A2), .14 (Supp. 1980), (is .mendcd by 1981 La. Acts,
No. 744, .1. See aIso LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.7,9, .16 (Supp. 1980), repealcd hiy 1981 La. Acts,
No. 744, S 2.
139. See. , Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Emma
G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. La. 1977).
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continues to enact legislation that it hopes will make abortion so dif-
ficult as to be impossible and still be constitutional. No doubt the
Legislature is trying to act not only in the best interests of the state
but in accordance with the temper of its citizenry.
Meanwhile the basic law of the state governing persons has not
been changed. The unborn is still considered a person in Louisiana
from the moment of conception, 4 0 and all successions opened will be
held for the unborn"1' and all his other interests protected.'42 Women
in Louisiana may have rights to their own bodies, because the Supreme
Court said they do, but in Louisiana, contrary to most "Common Law
states," the unborn has rights which must be considered in juxtaposi-
tion to those of the mother, at least until.the courts have ruled other-
wise. The recognition of the unborn as a person from the moment
of conception may have some intimidating effect upon anyone con-
sidering abortion, for statistics show that abortion is far from being
rampant in Louisiana.'
CONCLUSION
The grand tenor of change in the laws of Louisiana affecting
women has been toward giving women more independence and mak-
ing them more self-supporting. Probably the most important of the
statutes enacted in the past few decades has been the "Equal Manage-
ment" act, which gave married women far more rights in the manage-
ment of their patrimonial interests. Another important indication of
the increasing responsibility being placed upon women is the move-
ment toward "rehabilitative alimony." Additionally, in the past year
women, as surviving spouses, have gained substantial increases in in-
heritance and usufruct rights, but often at the expense of the rights
of parents and children, respectively.
The Legislature has not restricted its efforts in this regard to
the area of marriage and patrimonial rights of married women, ex-
wives, and widows, but has extended support to the business environ-
140. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 954, 956, 1482.
141. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 29, 954-56.
142. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 252, 1482, 1734.
143. A telephone conversation with Mr. Tom Ballinger of the Statistics Office of
the Department of Health in New Orleans revealed that the latest abortion statistics
for Louisiana are dated 1979. There were 13,512 abortions reported that year and
11,236 for 1978. These figures represent 166 abortions per 1,000 live births in Loui-
siana in 1979, as compared with 150 abortions per 1,000 live births in 1978. Louisiana
ranks approximately tenth lowest in the United States in incidence of abortions reported.
Mr. Ballinger thinks that abortions the country over are unreported by 35 to 50%,
although this figure is declining. Mr. Ballinger opined, also, that Louisiana's low abor-
tion rate probably reflects the conservative mind of its citizenry.
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ment as well. For instance, the Legislature has established such en-
tities as the Bureau of Women in the Department of Justice'" and
has adopted many statutes that enable women to become retrained
and to enter the work force, such as the "Displaced Homemaker" and
the "Assistance to Women-Owned Businesses" acts. Clearly, women
are coming of age in Louisiana. As they have gained more rights to
manage their own patrimonies and have assumed more responsibility
for them, women, however, have also sustained the loss of certain
privileges, preferences, and protections to which they were formerly
entitled.
144. Executive Order No. 64-12 (1964), establishing a Commission on the Status
of Women. The Commission was made permanent by 1968 La. Acts No. 43 and the
Bureau was established in conjunction with the reorganization of state government
pursuant to 1972 La. Acts. No. 253.

